Abstracts of Recent American Decisions by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF KANSAS. 1
SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND. 2
SUPREME COURT OF MICHIGAN.3
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK.'
SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA. 5
ACTION.
Contract or Tort- Waiver of Tort.-In many cases where one has
received goods wrongfully, a contract of purchase will be inferred, and
the owner may waive the tort and recover for goods sold and delivered:
Deysher v. Triebel, 64 Penna.
If there be no fraud a recovery cannot be had under a count for
goods sold and delivered, for the specific articles in the possession of a
defendant: Id.
Where a person tortiously in possession of another's goods converts
them into money or securities, assumpsit for money had and received
may be maintained: Id.
The count for money had and received is governed by equitable prin.
ciples, and lies only where the defendant ex xquo et bono ought to
refund the money received: Id.
Where there has been no deceit or unfair practice and the defendant
may with good conscience retain the money, he cannot, on a count for
money had and received, be compelled to repay, although he could not
have recovered it originally : Id.
T. sent shingles to J., which were delivered to D. In an action by
T. against D. for goods sold and delivered, D. might show that he received
the shingles by mistake, supposing they had been sent to him by K.,
with whom he had been dealing, and that he had settled with K. and
paid him without knowledge of the mistake: Id.
AGENT.
Broker mcing a Purchaser.-Where a court, in its charge, has once
correctly stated the law, it is not error to refuse a restatement: Gillet
v. (orum, 6 or 7 Kansas.
An agent employed to sell real estate, and finding a purchaser, and
bringing him and his principal into communication, and setting on foot
negotiations which result in a sale, cannot be deprived of his right to
compensation by a discharge prior to the consummation of the sale: Id.
ATTORNEY.
Acceptance of Service.-An attorney making an acknowledgment of
I From W. C. Webb, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 6 or 7 Kansas Rep.
9 From J. S. Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 33 Md. Rep.
3 From H. K. Clarke, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 20 Mich. Rep.
4 From Hon. 0. L. Barbour, Reporter; to appear in vol. 58 of his reports.
5 From P. F. Smith, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 64 Penn. Rep.
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service, on the back of a summons, will, iii the absence of proof to the
contrary, be presumed to have had authority for so doing: Ilendrix v.
Fuller, 6 or 7 Kansas.
Where one of two defendants in the county in which suit is brought
acknowledges service on the back of the summons, a summons for the
other defendant may rightfully issue to another county: Id.
A plaintiff may join in one action as defendants, the maker and
guarantor of a note: Id.
BETTING.
Return of Deposit.-Where two persons bet on a horse-race, and
deposit their money with a stakeholder, either party may, while the
money still remains with the stakeholder, and before the race is deter-
mined, demand a return of his deposit; and if the stakeholder refuse,
the depositor may maintain an action against him for the amount of the
deposit: Cleveland v. Wolf, 6 or 7 Kansas.
BILLS AND NOTES. See Attorney.
Consideration-Evidence-Arbitration.-Under an answer in a suit
on a promissory note which alleges in general terms that the note was
given without any consideration whatever, the defendant may offer tes-
timony going to show a want of consideration, and the plaintiff may
prove any consideration: Miller v. Brumbaugh, 6 or 7 Kansas.
A claim for compensation for labor and material which is not in suit
may, by consent of the parties, be referred to arbitrators, and their
award is conclusive unless impeached: Id.
The giving of a note for the amount of an award is a waiver of irregu-
larities in the arbitration proceeding: 
l.
Forged Endorsement.-If, in an action against an endorser of a pro-
missory note by the bond fide holders thereof, it be shown that the
endorsement was not genuine, and the defendant did not ratify or sanc-
tion it prior to the maturity of the note, and its transfer to the plaintiffs,
he is not liable: Woodruff v. .Munroe, 33 Md.
But if he adopted the note prior to its maturity, and by such adop-
tioa assisted in its negotiation, he would be estopped from setting up the
forgery in a suit by a bonO fide holder: Id.
But any admissions by the defendant made subsequently to the
maturity of the note, would not be evidence that he had authorized the
endorsement of his name thereon: ld.
Payment by Party interested.-The payment, after maturity, of a
promissory note secured by a mortgage, by a party who had acquired the
mortgagor's title to the mortgaged premises, by conveyance expressly
made subject to the mortgage, extinguishes the note; and if it be after-
wards put in circulation no recovery can be had upon it: Appledorn v.
Streeter, 20 Mich.
Possession of Note-Evidence of Payment.-Birkey made a note
payable to T. who endorsed it; it was afterwards endorsed "IJ. & B.
bleMakin." Four years after its maturity and after the death of B.
MeMakin, it was found amongst his papers. In a suit by J. MoMakin
as survivor, evidence was given, that B. McMakin directed credit for the
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amount of the note to be given to an account of defendant against J. &
B. McMakin. Held, to be evidence of appropriation to that account:
Birkey v. McMakin, 64 Penn.
Under this evidence, the defendant's book of original entries against
B. McMakin and J. B. McMakin was evidence: Id.
The endorsement "J. & B. McMakin," and the note being found in
possession of B. McMakin, was evidence that the note belonged to
him and he had the right to make the appropriation: Id.
The note was unclaimed in the possession of B. McMakin for four
years after maturity and until after his death. Held, to be corroborative
of the ownership of B. MoIieakin and of his appropriation to the
accounts : Id.
BROKER.
Stock-Purchase by Broker-Ability to deliver at any time.-Seal, a
broker, bought stock on the order of Wynkoop, paid for it, and informed
him of the purchase. The stock was delivered to Seal; he frequently
asked Wynkoop to take the stock, and although there might have been
times when no stock was in his name, he could at any time have
delivered it to Wynkoop, who never requested a delivery. Seal might
recover for the money advanced: Wynkoop v. Seal, 64 Penn.
Wynkoop was estopped from alleging that Seal could not comply,
having never offered payment or demanded delivery of the stock, and
Seal being ready to deliver at the time of trial : Id.
It was not error to refuse to charge, that the plaintiff could not
recover, because at some intermediate time, Seal had not the stock
standing in his name or had temporarily hypothecated it: Id.
Shares of stock are alike, and a transfer procured to be made by
another of the stock would have been a compliance: If.
CARRIERS.
Nature of their Liubillty.-Common carriers are liable in two capaci-
ties; one as insurers and one as warehousemen. If an injury hap-
pened to goods from any cause except the act of God or the public
enemies, while the carriers are insurers, an action lies against them by
the owners for damages, and is made out without further inquiry: Good-
win et al. v. The Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, 58 Barb.
But if the injury happens after the goods are claimed to have been
delivered, the question arises whether the defendants' liability as com-
mon carriers, in all its rigor, had, under.the circumstances, ceased; and
if so, whether the defendants had exercised that care of the property
required of them as warehousemen: Id.
Delivery, what amounts to.-Carriers are bound to deliver goods
transported by them. Delivery is not effected by placing the property
in a position where it cannot be obtained by the owner or consignee: Id.
A quantity of sheet-iron, consigned to the plaintiffs, at New York,
and transported by the defendants, was unloaded upon the wharf, in New
York. The plaintiffs received notice of the arrival of the ship in which
the iron was brought, and received a small portion of the iron uninjured.
On sending for the remainder, they were'unable to get it until some
days after it was placed upon the pier, by reason of other freight hay-
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ing been so placed that the iron could not be reached. While in this
position, it was damaged by rain. Held, that the defendants were bound
to deliver the goods at the usual place, and to deliver them in a con-
veniently reasonable method for their removal; and that the plaintiffs
were bound to exercise reasonable diligence in removing them: Id.
.VNotke of Arrival of Goods; Removal.-IBeld also, that it was
for the jury to determine whether a reasonable time had elapsed after
notice of the arrival of the iron, for the plaintiffs to remove it, before it
was injured by the rain. That after the expiration of a reasonable time,
the liability of the defendants as insurers ceased, and their duty or
liabili ty became that of warehousemen, which required that they should
exercise over the property, and for its protection, ordinary care and
diligence; d.
Want of ordinary Care and .Diligence; Burthen of Proof.-That
the burthen of proof was upon the plaintiffs to show that the defendants
did not use such care and diligence; and if the jury found that negli-
gence was proved, the defendants were liable, even though their duty as
common carriers was ended: Id.
Rule of Damages for .Breac of Contract.-The rule of damages
which prevails in an action for the breach of a contract to transport
goods, where the owner is unable to procure the goods to be carried in
any other manner, does not -apply when, upon the failure of the carrier
to perform, the owner of the goods can send them by another convey-
ance: Grund v. Pendergast, 58 Barb.
In such a case the owner must send the goods by another convey-
ance; and if he does so, he will be entitled to recover the difference
between the price at which the defendant undertook to carry the pro-
perty and the price which the owner was compelled to pay for its
transportation: Id.
CORPORATION,
ZTury to PrHvate Property by Construction of Canal.-The use of
the canal of an incorporated company cannot be rendered contingent
by injunctions to restrain it on allegations of injuries to private par-
ties by its construction or use: Union Canal Company's Appeal, 64
Penna.
Where there is a provision in an act incorporating a canal company,
&o., for injuries for taking private property, the mode designated must
be pursued: Id.
The Constitution does not require consequential injuries to be pre-
paid: Id.
A bill was filed to restrain defendants from diverting water from a
mill; by the answer and evidence it was shown that the defendants were
acting by order of a canal company. The court permitted the plaintiff
to amend the bill by making the company a party, allowed a replication to
be filed nuncpro tune, and made a decree against the company without
service on them. Held, to be erroneous: Id.
Inquests of Damages in Railroad Cases- Competency of Stockholders
as Jurors.-A stockholder of a railroad corporation is not competent to
sit as a juror upon an inquest impannelled to determine the necessity of
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taking, and the compensation to be allowed to the owner of land taken
for the use of the corporation, and the verdict of a jury-one or
more of whose members are thus disqualified-is void: Peninsular
Railway Co. v. Howard, 20 Mich.
Railroad corporations seeking the condemnation of lands for their use
must at their peril raise such objection to the competency of a juror
when it is known to them; and it is the duty of the juror himself to
disclose such interest: Id.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Certainty of Verdict.-Under an information, which, in one count of
murder in the first degree, charges all the different degrees of felonious
homicide, including murder in the first and second degrees, and man-
slaughter in its four different degrees, a verdict that finds the prisoner
guilty, as charged, without specifying of what degree of the offence he is
found guilty, is not such a verdict as will authorize a judgment for
murder in the first degree; nor is the court authorized to look outside
the verdict to ascertain that the jury intended by such verdict, a verdict
of murder in the first degree: The State v. .Reddick, 6 or 7 Kansas.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR.
Fraudulent Sale of Goods-Change of Possession.-Fraud in fact
in the transfer of chattels, consists in the intention to prevent creditors
from recovering their just debts, by an act which withdraws the debtor's
property from their reach. Acts which though not fraudulently intended,
yet as their tendency is to defraud creditors, if they vest the property
of the debtor in his grantee, are void for legal fraud, which is tantamount
to actual fraud: McKibbin v. Martin, 64 Penn.
Actual fraud is for the jury. Legal fraud, where the facts are undis-
puted or are ascertained, is for the court: Id.
The retention of possession by the vendor of chattels is a fraud in
law whenever they are capable of delivery and no honest and fair reason
can be given for the vendor not giving up possession to the vendee: Id.
Where there is evidence from which a jury could infer under instruc-
tions of the court, that there had been an actual and exclusive change
of possession, the question should be submitted to them. The court is
to judge whether there is sufficient evidence to infer such delivery: Id.
Where the subject of the sale is not reasonably capable of an actual
delivery, a constructive delivery will be sufficient. In such case it is
only necessary that the vendee should assume the control of the subject
so as reasonably to indicate to all concerned, the change of ownership.
The question is, did the vendor do all that might be reasonably ex-
pected in the case of a real and honest sale; Id.
In the case of a large hotel, it is enough for the vendee of the furni-
ture, &c., to assume the direction and control of them in such an open
and notorious manner as usually accompanies an honest transaction: Id.
The possession of the chattels by the vendee must be exclusive of the
vendor. A possession which in law is concurrent is such as will lead
persons to infer that there has been no actual change: Id.
Where there has been a sufficient delivery, actual or constructive,
and the vendee is in possession, the fact that the vendor is employed
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about the establishment in a capacity holding out no indicia of owner-
ship, is not such a concurrent ownership as the law condemns, and the
question is for the jury: Id.
DEED.
Parol Evidence to show Trust.-In the absence of fraud, mistake or
accident, the grantor, in an absolute conveyance reciting a valuable con-
sideration and acknowledging its receipt, and where it is admitted a
valuable consideration was actually received, cannot show by a parol
agreement that the grantee was to hold the land conveyed in truth for
his benefit: .Morrall v. Waterson, 6 or 7 Kansas.
ELECTIONS. See Evidence.
EVIDENCE. See Bills and Notes.
Bill of Sale.-In an action for the conversion of personal property,
when the plaintiff never having had actual possession, bases his right
to recover on an alleged purchase, if it appear that such purchase was
concluded in, and evidenced by a bill of sale, such bill of sale is the
best evidence of the fact and conditions of such purchase: Barnett v.
Williams, 6 or 7 Kansas.
Partnershi.-In a question as to E. being a partner, H. of the firm
of H. & F. testified that J. was a partner and that E. asked for the
books and said he had as much interest as J. Beld, that the books of
H. & F. were admissible: Frick v. Barbour, 64 Penn.
Testimony often consists in what is not proved as well as in what is
proved. When withholding testimony raises a violent presumption that
a fact not clearly proved or disproved exists, it is not error in the
court to allude to the withholding, as a circumstance strengthening the
proof: Id.
Qualification of Jurors-Declaration of a Party as Evidence-Compe-
tency of Jurors as Witnesses-Rebutting Evidence-Evidence of _Afa-
lice-Exemplary Damages.-The formation or expression of an opinion
that the defendants, as judges of election, "ought to have received
the votes of all registered persons, without further question," does not
disqualify a person from acting as juror in a suit against the judges for
damages, for not receiving the vote of one who was registered : EMbin
v. Wilson, 33 Md.
In an action for damages against judges of election for corruptly
refusing the vote of the plaintiff who was registered, the fact that the
defendants knew that he differed from them in his political sentiments,
is admissible as an element of proof to be considered by the jury,
together with other facts, in determining how far they were influenced
by bias, prejudice, or corrupt motives in rejecting his vote: Id.
But the declarations of the plaintiff made to other parties, tending to
prove that he came within the disqualifying clause of the Constitution
of 1864, and which were unknown to the defendants when they rejected
his vote, are not admissible as evidence to exempt them from liability:
1d.
A grand juror cannot be required to state what efforts he made to
procure an indictment against a person, what opinions were expressed by
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his fellows or himself, or what was the action of any juror in regard to
the subject of inquiry before them: Id.
A judge of election, sued by a person whose vote he had refused to
receive, testified that he had rejected the plaintiff's vote because of his
known disloyal sentiments, and that in doing so he was not governed by
any bias or prejudice against the plaintiff. Held: That to rebut this
evidence and to show malice on the part of the defendant, it was com-
petent for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant, as register, had
registered a person as a voter, who at the time declared the same
disloyal sentiments, for the expression of which the defendant claimed
to have rejected the plaintiff's vote: Id.
If a registered voter tenders his vote at an election, and the judges
wilfully, corruptly, and fraudulently refuse to receive it, he is entitled
to recover in an action against them, such exemplary damages as the
jury may consider proper under the circumstances: 1(.
EXECUTOR.
Commssions-Payment-Interest.-Commissions to accountants are
due at the time the services for which they are allowed, are performed:
Parker's Estate, 64 Penn.
A reasonable amount may be retained by an executor, &c., to pay
expenses and other charges: Id.
When an executor pays to those entitled, within a reasonable time
after funds are received, he will not be charged with interest: Id.
It is improper and unlawful for an executor to mix the funds of the
estate with his own. In this case, the executor was on that account
charged with the costs of the appeal: Id.
FRAUD.
Fraud in obtaining a Contract, or Failure of Consideration, may be
relied on as a Defence by a Party sued upon such Contract-Evidence.
-In an action by the payee against the maker of a promissory note,
given for the balance of the purchase-money agreed to be paid for the
assignment to the latter of the exclusive right to use and sell, within
certain counties in Maryland, a patented invention, it is competent for
the defendant to prove, as a bar to the action, that he was induced to
purchase by means of false representations on the part of the plaintiff
as to the usefulness of the invention, although after having discovered
that the invention was of no value whatever, the defendant made no
offer to surrender or re-assign it to the vendor: Groffv. .Hansel, 33 Md.
An offer to pay a part of a note in discharge of the whole, made with
a view to a compromise, but not accepted, is inadmissible in evidence in
a suit on the note against the maker: Id.
GIr.
Confidential Relation- Undue Influence.-A gift obtained by any
person standing in a confidential relation to the donor, isprima facie
void, and the burden is thrown on the donee to establish to the satis-
faction of the court, that it was the free, voluntary, unbiassed act of the
donor; a Court of Equity on grounds of public policy, watches such
transactions with a jealous scrutiny, and to set them aside, it is not
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necessary to aver or prove actual fraud, or that there was such a degree
of infirmity or imbecility of mind in the donor as amounts to legal
incapacity to make a will or execute a valid deed or contract: Todd v.
G-rove, 33 Md.
B., an aged man, blind and crippled, being possessed of considerable real
estate and a very large personal property, invited his brother V., then
living in Illinois, to come and live with him and take charge of his
business. -V. thereupon sold out his personal effects in Illinois, and with
his wife and daughter came to Maryland, in October 1866, and took up
his residence in the same house with his brother, and had the whole
care and custody of his large real and personal estate, and acted as his
agent in the transaction of all his business from that time until his
death which occurred in December following. While this relation sub-
sisted between them, in the early part of December, gifts and transfers
of private securities and United States bonds to the amount of nearly
$50,000, were made by B. to his brother. The donor had at the time
two other brothers, a wife and numerous nephews and nieces living, as
also grandchildren, offspring of a deceased natural son, who had lived
in the house with him. At the date of the gifts, the physical health
of the donor was greatly impaired and his mind weakened to such an
extent at least, as to make it more easily the subject of influence and
less able to resist importunity. It was also shown that the donee, before
coming and while making his preparations to come to Maryland, had
deliberately formed the purpose to acquire and exert an influence over
his brother for his own advantage and that of the other heirs, to the
prejudice of the wife. On a bill filed by the'widow and administratrix
of the donor, for the purpose of vacating and annulling the gifts and
transfers made to his brother, it was held: That the influence which the
donee possessed, from the relation in which he stood to his brother, was
unduly exercised for his own advantage, and the gifts and transfers
made to him were invalid and could not be permitted to stand: Id.
GRAND JURY. See Evidence.
HOMESTEAD.
Neither the constitution nor the statute exempts a contemplated
future homestead; and therefore, land on which no dwelling-house had
ever been erected, or commenced, and on which neither the complain-
ant nor his family had ever resided, is not exempt as a homestead. Bee-
cher v. Baldy, 7 Mich. 501, cited and approved: Coolidge v. Wells, 20
Mich.
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See Will.
Divorce on the ground of Cruelty-Evidence.-While it is true that
,in a bill for a divorce on the ground of cruelty, the specific acts on which
the charge rests must be set out in the bill; the evidence is not neces-
sarily limited to the particular facts charged. Evidence of other facts
which serve to give character to the specified facts proved, is admissible.
Thus, acts of personal violence, when intrinsically and separately con-
sidered, may not amount to such a degree of cruelty as to justify a
divorce; yet when attended by habitual brutal behavior, so as to be a
constant outrage upon the sense of decency and propriety of the party
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to be affected by them, a case of extreme cruelty within the meaning
of the statute is established: Brigys v. Briggs, 20 Mich.
Parol Promise to Marrl.-A contract to marry not in writing, and
not to be performed until after more than a- year has elapsed, is void
under the Statute of Frauds: Nichols v. Weaver, 6 or 7 Kansas.
Wife's Contract for .Money loaned.-A party who lends to a wife
money, known to him to be for her private use, and who at the wife's
request conceals the fact of such lending from the husband, cannot
maintain an action against the husband for the money loaned: Franklin
v. Foster, 20 Mich.
INSURANCE.
Construction of Contract.-S. entered into a contract of insurance
with the Baltimore Marine Insurance Company. The policy excluded
all shipments unless approved and endorsed on the policy-the valuation
to be fixed by the endorsement. By the course of dealing between S.
and the company, applications for insurance were indicated by endorsing
the names of the articles to be insured in a policy-book attached to the
policy; and afterwards, generally on the same or ensuing day, the valu-
ation was extended on invoices furnished by S., on application of the
company. A loss having occurred, it was discovered that one item was
simply endorsed in the policy-book, and that its value had not been ex-
tended, no invoice having been furnished. On suit by S. for the value
of this article, held: 1st. That this was a valued and not an open
policy, and the applicant for insurance having failed to furnish the invoice,
as was his duty, was not entitled to recover. 2d. That under this run-
ning, but valued policy, each and every shipment, for the insurance of
which application is made, becomes a distinct insurance to be determined
by the provisions of the policy and the endorsements in the policy-book.
3d. That the contract of insurance was not complete, as to any speci-
fic shipment, until the endorsement of the value; and it was too late to
ask for such endorsement when the shipment was in all probability lost:
Schaefer v. Baltimore Mar. Ins. Co., 33 Md.
JURoR. See Corporation; Evidence.
LANDLORD AND TENANT.
Attornment.-Attornment is unnecessary in Pennsylvania: Tilford
v. Fleming, 64 Penn.
Attornment is not required to enable the alienee to be restored to
the estate when the tenant's term is ended : Jd.
An alienee may proceed in his own name to obtain possession of pre-
mises let by his alienor: Id.
Attornment is not the initiation of a new lease, it is merely the assent
of the tenant to the landlord's alienation, and the acceptance of the
alienee as his landlord; the lease is untouched in other respects: Id.
MANDAMUS.
Where the electors of a town at a special town meeting, by resolution,
authorized the supervisor, town clerk, and one of the justices to issue
certificates of indebtedness to the amount of $300, as bounty to each
volunteer enlisting or enlisted into the U. S. Army, and credited the said
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town : Held, that upon the refusal of such town officers to issue to a
volunteer bringing himself within the provisions of the resolution such
certiicate of indebtedness, a mandamus was the proper remedy: The
People ex rel. Vanderlin v. Martin et al., 58 Barb.
.Held, also, that if the town officers had not met, no other demand of
performance could be made than a several demand; and if it was neces-
sary for the officers to meet to perform their duty, then a demand that
they issue a certificate was of itself a demand, that they should meet for
that purpose: Id.
MERGER. See Will.
MORTGAGE.
Absolute Deed with Covenant to reconvey.-Gubbings conveyed to
Harper by absolute deed, and about the same time they agreed in writ-
ing that at Gubbinds' request within three years, Harper would recon-
vey, Gubbings paying him an advance of $500. Held: that the trans-
action was a mortgage: Ha;pers' Appeal, 64 Penn.
Gubbings did not demand a reconveyance for nine years: field:
that he was not barred by the 6th sect. of Act of April 22d 1856
(Limitation): Id.
Whenever there is an advance of moneyto be returned within a spe-
cified time upon the security of an absolute conveyance, it is a mortgage,
whatever the form adopted or the understanding of the parties: Id.
Harper on the execution of the deed took possession and after the
expiration of the three years made permanent improvements, which the
master found to be reasonable : held, that he should be allowed for these
improvements: Id.
When property is held avowedly as a pledge, a mortgagee in posses-
sion should not be. allowed for costly and permanent improvements,
without the consent of the mortgagor, but he should be allowed for
such repairs as are proper to preserve the estate from dilapidation, with-
out holding him to proof of absolute necessity : Id.
After-acquired Property.-A railroad company under authority of
law, mortgaged "all their road, property, rights, liberties, privileges,
corporate franchises, income, tolls and receipts then held or thereafter to
be acquired" "in trust for the use, benefit and security of the holders
of certain bonds therein described." Held, that the mortgage was a
lien upon engines, rolling-stock, &c., in actual use by the company and
required for the transaction of its business, whether owned at the date
of the mortgage or afterwards acquired: The Philadelphia, Wilmington
and Baltimore Railroad Co. v. Woelper, 64 Penn.
One may grant the future accretions of any subject he owns at the
time of the grant: Id.
A mortgage will pass all structures or fixtures that may afterwards
be erected on land by the mortgagor: Id.
Contingent estates and interests are assignable in equity: Id.
Contingent interests may be the subject of a contract which, if made
for a valuable consideration, will be specifically enforced, when the event
happens: Id.
Equity will treat a mortgage of property, whether real or personal, to
be subsequently acquired, as a binding contract: Id.
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PARTITION.
Decree for.-Where a decree in partition required the referee to pay
and discharge out of the proceeds of the sale, all taxes, charges and
assessments which might be a lien on the premises : instead of which as
appeared by his report of sale, he sold subject to such liens: ileld,
that the order confirming the report was erroneous, and the sanie was
reversed and the sale set aside and vacated, as being contrary to the
decree: ilobart et al. v. Hobart et al., 58 Barb.
Where advancements have been made by a parent during his lifetime
to a portion of his children, in an action between his heirs after his
death, for a partition, such advancements should be provided for, in the
decree. It is erroneous to adjudge and decree that each child is entitled
to an equal share, as though no advancements had been made: Id.
If advancements have been made to a portion of the children beyond
the amount of their respective shares, they will have no share or interest
in the lands sought to be partitioned: and if the advancements made to
such as do inherit are all different in amounts, their shares in the pre-
mises will be in unequal proportions: Id.
Where the rights and interests of the several parties, in a partition
suit, have, by the judgment or decree, been adjudged to be altogether
different from those to which they were entitled by law, it seems there
is no way by which the error can be remedied, except by a reversal of
the judgment, and the ordering of a new trial: Id.
PARTNERSHIP. See Evidence.
Notes made by Partners-Liability of Firm.-On the formation of a
partnership between S. & J. under the firm name of "J. S.," a note was
made by S. in his own name, which he procured to be discounted by
the plaintiff, for the purpose of enabling him to pay in his share of the
capital. S. did not represent to the plaintiff that it was a firm note;
and the payees, as officers of the plaintiff's bank, knew or had good
reason to believe, that the note was not the note of the firm, but was
the individual note of S. Held, that J. was not liable as a party to the
note in any form: and no recovery could be had against him by the
plaintiff, as holder thereof: The National Bank of Chemung v. Ingra.
ham, 58 Barb.
Held also, that even if the note had been discounted after the part-
nership had commen6ed business, the legal presumption would be that
it was the note of the individual who signed it and not the note of the
firm: Id.
That to entitle the holder to recover in such a case against the part-
ners, it must go further, and prove, either that the money for which
the note was given, was borrowed on the credit of the partnership, or
that it was used, when obtained, in the business of the partnership: Id.
That the burthen of proof was upon the plaintiff, to show that the 0
note was discounted upon the credit of the partnership: Md.
That if the lender did not know of the partnership: or if the money
was loaned on the individual credit of the maker of the note: the fact
that the money was applied to the business of the firm did not create a
liability on the part of the firm, or constitute the lender a creditor of
the firm : Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
PLEADING.
Averment of Joint Undertaking.-In an action upon a special agree-
ment against two persons, the plaintiff cannot recover unless he avers
and proves a joint undertaking.; and in such an action, evidence of an
original contract, signed by one of the defendants, together with an
agreement signed by the other "to become security for the performance
of the foregoing contract," although alleged to have been simultaneously
executed, was held inadmissible to prove a joint contract. Whether
proof that both the original and the collateral undertaking were sup-
ported by the same consideration would render the undertaking joint;
-Quire : Lee v. Bolles, 20 Mich.
POWER.
Intention to Execute-&itus of the Property.-The intention of the
donee of a power is the criterion to determine its execution. The inten-
tion must appear in the instrument, which must refei to the power to
be executed or actually dispose of its subject: Bingham's .4ppeal, 64
Penn.
The intention to execute may be ascertained, when the instrument
cannot have any operation, except that the donee intended to execute
the power. Merely the fact that the bequests exceed the testator's
estate, will not manifest an intention to execute a power: Id.
The subject of a power is the property of the donor, not of the
donee, in whom it is but a trust: Id.
An English statute provides that a bequest of personal property, &c.,
in a general manner, shall include personal property of which the tes-
tator had the appointment. Held, that such bequest by the donee
residing in England, of a power created by the will of a resident of
Pennsylvania, did not pass property under the will: Id.
The law of the situs of the subject of the power, controls the execu-
tion of the power: Id.
Quo WARRANTO.
Church-trustees.-Quo warrant is the proper remedy against persons
usurping the office of trustees of a chartered church: Commonwealth
ex rel. Gordon v. Graham, 64 Penn.
A motion to quash must be for some defect in the suggestion itself,
not for any matters outside. Mere defects in form that can be amended,
will not be regarded on a motion to quash: Id.
SHIPPING.
Supplies-Credit of faster.-The .owners of a ship, though in a
home port where they or their agents resideare responsible for neces-
sary supplies furnished on the order of the captain, unless it should
appear that they were furnished exclusively on his credit: li'insor et
al. v. .Haddork et'al., 64 Penn.
Supplies furnished ship, on the order of the captain; no demand had
been made on the owners for their payment until fifteen months after
the last item. From these circumstances alone there could be no
inference that exclusive credit had been given to the captain : Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
Taking of Land for a Road.-The person to whom damages for
opening a road are awarded in the first instance, has no vested right to
receive them until the final order to open, and if before the final order
he conveys the land, the right to receive the damages passed to the
vendee: .Meginnis v. Nunamaker, 64 Penn.
A vendee of land through which a road was opened after his pur-
chase, may recover the damages from his vendor to whom they were
assessed and who received them from the county treasurer: Id.
Extinguishment of the Vendor's Lien-Mortgage.-Where the vendor
of real estate withheld the deed until nearly the half of the purchase-
money was paid, and then, upon receiving the bond or note of the pur-
chaser, with approved security for the balance, delivered to him the
deed, without any agreement for preserving the vendor's lien, it must be
considered as extinguished: Carrio v. Farmers' and Merchants' Nat.
Bank, 33 Md.
A mortgage of real estate is valid without attestation: Id.
Change of Title.-Where one is in possession of property with no
other claim of title thereto than a partial or conditional one, as pur-
chaser under a void contract of sale, which each party refuses to per-
form, except according to his own understanding of its terms, the title
of the property is not changed, and the vendor is entitled to recover
such property, upon legal demand made: Fullerton v. Dalton, 58
Barb.
After demand of such property is made, the purchaser is wrongfully
in possession; and his use of the property afterwards is a conversion
thereof to his own use: Id.
Contract to purchase at Future Time.-Fisher conveyed real estate, a
steamboat and other property to Reitz, with the stipulation that Reitz
should reconvey within a year at the same price on three months' notice
by Fisher. Fisher gave the notice; before the time for reconveyance
the boat was wrecked by an ice flood. On the day fixed in the notice,
Reitz tendered a conveyance of all the property, including the boat in its
wrecked condition. Held, that Fisher was not bound to accept. The
notice amounted only to an engagement to take the property sold to
Reitz. It was not a present purchase, so as to vest the property in
Fisher: Reitz's Appeal, 64 Penn.
If the personal property did not exist in the form it was when the
reservation for repurchase was made, Fisher was not bound to take it,
and the notice did not alter this condition. When there is a contract
to purchase at a future time no title passes : Id.
VERDICT.
SPecial Finding of Facts inconsistent with Verdict.-When the spe-
cial findings of fact are inconsistent with the general veraict of a jury,
the former control the latter, and judgment may be rendered accord- -
ingly: Nichols v. Weaver, G or 7 Kansas.
The Supreme Court will give the same construction to the findings
